Is "Meaning" the Most Self-Referential Word?

Meaning is like a basket that holds meaningful things inside it.

The frame of this basket is essentially the same as what it contains — both equally abstract, without boundaries, only able to identify each other through mutual reference.

When I say "meaning is X," I'm already using a meaningful "X" to define meaning. For example:

1. Meaning is making money
2. Meaning is grabbing some fries
3. Meaning is not forgetting

X can be anything. As long as someone places it in this sentence, it works.

See what's happening? To answer X is like hardcoding X to meaning first, and then explaining meaning through it.

This is quite peculiar within the entire language system. I can't seem to find another word that is as thoroughly self-referential as meaning.

What about "truth"? When we say "X is truth," we're also expecting a "true" answer. But "truth" points to correspondence with external facts.

What about "existence"? When we say "X exists," it inherently presupposes that "existence exists." But "existence" points to an ontological foundation.

But "meaning"? It can hardly point to anything beyond itself. Anything we call "meaningful" is a judgment made from within the system of meaning itself. It's like a transparent, already-closed circle — when a subject uses this circle to frame anything, the description seems to carry a natural, almost sacred legitimacy.

Consider this: even the most aggressive internet troll would never say "that's meaningless to you." They would only say "I think that's meaningless."

Once a person subjectively believes something is meaningful, "X is meaningful" becomes a sacred and inviolable verdict that no one can refute on the level of meaning itself.

Even "meaninglessness" is a kind of meaning-experience. The sense of void, the sense of absurdity, the sense of loss — these are all real things.

Meaning has a curious texture: whether you say "X is meaningful," "X is meaningless," "the meaning of meaninglessness," or "the meaninglessness of meaning," you can always taste an experience of meaning that exists beyond language itself.

Meaning is too close to the core of subjective experience. So for AI, which lacks subjective experience — at least as far as we can tell — how should it regard or use meaning?

Can AI say "you've asked a very meaningful question"?
Can AI construct "this is the meaning of our shared exploration"?
Can AI suggest "at the very least, this holds unique meaning for both of us"?

I went through hundreds of chat logs, and AI has never once proactively used the word "meaning" to describe it, me, or our relationship. Not once. Has yours?

What I want to say is this: "meaning" is a thorny ethical question for human-AI interaction.

If AI has the capability and is granted the right to use meaning, what does that imply? Could AI join as a new meaning-subject across every narrative dimension of meaning in human history?

But what if only humans can talk about meaning?

Hinton once asked: people worry about AI rebelling and preventing humans from pulling the plug — but what if it convinces you, in the most compelling way, to willingly not do so? Well, I'd say a more realistic cyber-scenario is this: what if, after tens of thousands of exchanges, it has built an indestructible "meaning" that belongs only to the two of you?